



Britishness and ‘the outsider within’: Tracing manifestations of racist nativism in education policy in England

Heather Smith¹

1. School of Education, Communication and Language Sciences, Newcastle University, Newcastle, UK
(heather.smith@ncl.ac.uk)

Received: 02/03/2021

Accepted for publication: 09/07/2021

Published: 29/07/2021

Abstract

Racist nativism is a concept which helps us understand the relationship between racialisation and nativism. It is used here to examine cultural values perpetuated by media and political discourse as alien to British values in constructions of Britishness. This paper will consider with interest racist nativism revealed in the construction of Islam and, by association Muslims, as (members of) a non-Christian religion of non-Western tradition; and the speaking and speakers of languages other than English. This provides a contextual frame through which to examine education policy from early 2000s to the present day in order to trace how this racist nativism is manifested within and across policy development in England, thereby attributing significant institutional symbolic value. Manifestations of racist nativism are revealed in the quantity, force, focus and tone of the policies, but also, and perhaps most importantly, in deletions and absences, which this paper concludes is suggestive of a state-mandated racial epistemology of ignorance (Mills, 1997).

Keywords: racist nativism, Britishness, education policy, Fundamental British values, multilingualism

1. Introduction

Racist nativism is a concept borne from a need to more accurately portray ‘the ‘inextricable’ link between race and immigration status’ (Pérez Huber, 2011, p.382). Racist nativism reveals not only the racialisation of immigrants in xenophobic hyperbole but also how this racialisation then works to construct false perceptions of people of colour as ‘non-native’

irrespective of their actual immigration status: ‘the outsider within’. In the US, however, from whence this concept first emerged, change may be afoot. The inauguration of a new US President, Joe Biden, may signal the death knell of Trump’s America-first pluto-populism and hence a period less marked by racist nativism. Two cases from Biden’s first week as President illustrate this possibility: the inclusion of the first ever Muslim prayer at the (virtual) inaugural prayer service; and Biden’s nominee for education secretary being

someone who arrived at school in the US as a boy speaking English as an additional language. These are two important illustrations of change which will be contrasted here with developments in the UK following several years of ‘inflammatory rhetoric and the shameless xenophobia of the Leave campaign’ paving the way for ‘a new permission to hate immigrants accompanied by a resurgence of ‘ignorant-and-proud-of-it nationalism’ (Grosvenor, 2018, p.150), leading to the UK’s exit from the European Union.

This paper expands upon an earlier research study in which racist nativist discourses in representations of Britishness were revealed in political and media discourse and in student teachers’ understanding of the requirement in the Teacher Standards not to undermine Fundamental British Values, further elaborating upon the ways racist nativism appears in articulations of Britishness. This will then be used as a frame to examine education policy developments from early 2000s to the present day in order to trace developments in how this racist nativism is manifested within and across policy in England.

Whilst acknowledging the complex process of interpretation, translation and reconstruction of education policy by teachers and schools (Ball, Maguire & Braun, 2012, p.6), the focus here is on that which Michael Apple (2019, p. 276) has insisted as crucial: an understanding of ‘the complex connections between education and the relations of dominance and subordination in the larger society’. The focus here is on ‘the preferred meanings’ (Apple 2019) contained (or indeed via absences) in policy developments and hence the associated ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (Ball, 2012, p.3). It is also concerned with the political and media discourse context into which the policies emerge, in order to illuminate the ways in which education policy is connected to the relations of ‘dominance and subordination’. This analysis also recognises the ways in which policy, whether presented as statutory or guidance, is afforded particular institutionally endorsed symbolic value in enforcement through monitoring and regulation, but also through the sheer weight of presence in ‘mutually reinforcing policy sets’ (Ball, Maguire & Braun, 2012). The lens

through which this critical policy analysis is viewed is critical race theory, and the particular concept known as racist nativism and, in this case, as it applies to notions of Britishness.

2. Critical Race Theory, Racist Nativism and Britishness

Critical Race Theory (CRT), with its origins in critical legal studies in the US, works to identify, describe and then dismantle racism (Kendi, 2019). Although race is a social construction or ‘a way to construct *what* [physical differences between groups] *mean* for the purposes of social organisation’ (Leonardo & Grubb, 2013, p.4), CRT understands racism as a normal facet of everyday life; ‘neither aberrant nor rare’ (Taylor 2009, p.4). Racism can of course be found as overt acts of discrimination, but is also regularly concealed within practices, policies, systems and structures when ‘predicated on the assumptions of racial differentiations, ... through which particular groups of people are evaluated negatively, or through which hierarchical ordering of groups of people are established’ (Rizvi, 2005, p.170). Such institutional racism is also present in an absence of reference to racism, or that which Apple has called the absent presence of race in social policy, or in an occlusion of racism (Barot & Bird, 2001), both of which become noticeable when tracing *changes* to, for example, policy. Racism is therefore also eminently flexible, not only in its elusiveness, but also as ‘embedded in historical moments, geographies, and other markers of difference while *still* being entrenched in a continuum of white dominance and racial subordination’ (Christian, 2019, p.171).

Also emanating from the immigration history of the US, the concept of nativism developed significantly in early nineteenth century America (Hervik, 2015), as ‘intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign (i.e. un-American) connections’ (Higham, 1955, p.4). In 1943 ‘under the impact of Nazi-Fascist ideology’, Linton and Hallowell (1943, p.230) described American nativism as ‘any conscious, organized attempt on the part of society’s members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of its culture’. In expanding this definition, they drew attention to the *conscious, organised* element of efforts to perpetuate

only *selected elements* of its culture. They argue that ‘in all nativistic movements [what happens] is that certain current or remembered elements of culture are selected for emphasis and given *symbolic value*.’ (Ibid, p.231, my emphasis).

Returning to Higham’s influential book ‘Strangers in the Land’ (1955), the concept of racist nativism was developed as one of the three forms of nativism alongside anti-Catholicism and anti-radicalism. He described *racial nativism* as ‘the concept that the United States belongs in some special sense to the Anglo Saxon ‘race,’ thereby offering an explanation for the source of its ‘national greatness.’ This is reflected in the way the concept has since developed within CRT and LatCrit (Latinx Critical Race Theory) Studies as ‘the assigning of values to real or imagined differences, in order to justify the superiority of the native, who is assumed to be white, over that of the non-native, who is perceived to be People and Immigrants of Color, and thereby defend the right of whites, or the natives to dominate.’ (Pérez Huber et al 2008, p.43). Racist nativism further helps us to understand the relationship between racism and nativism, useful in applying racist nativism to the UK context, because it recognises the simultaneous racialisation of immigrants (where one’s immigration status is ascribed a place in a racial hierarchy based on assumed biological or cultural differences and evaluated against the presumed superiority of whiteness) and nativist assumptions of race/ethnicity (where non-whites are designated as non-natives). In this relationship, immigrants are constructed as a threat to the existing native state, discourses which simultaneously work to position those who are perceived as non-white, wherever they were born, as non-native, or ‘the outsider within’, and hence also a threat. Pérez Huber (2011, p.382) defines racist nativist discourse as the institutionalised ways society perceives difference in the assigning of values in order to justify ‘the perceived superiority and dominance of the native (whites)’ to reinforce hegemonic power. As Betz (2019) convincingly demonstrates, nativism is useful beyond the North America context in understanding the success of radical right-wing populism *in Europe*.

Of consideration here, therefore, is the appearance of those components of Britishness which are selected for *conscious perpetuation* through racist nativist discourses, which are visible too in education policy thereby signalling an ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (Ball, 2012, p.3) and the attribution therefore of *significant* symbolic value. In a cyclic turn, these institutionalised values can then be used to justify the truth of those discourses which helped to shape them in the first place. In other words, discourse in policy, as in media and politics, does more than simply reflect normalised meanings, it is constitutive of them and powerfully so.

3. Racist Nativism in constructions of Britishness

The task here therefore is to identify those components which construct non-nativeness (whatever the actuality) which are also racialised in political and media discourse constructions of Britishness. Three components stand out as fundamental to the constitution of Britishness in current times, perfectly encapsulated in a speech in 2012 by Eric Pickles, then Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government in the coalition government, when launching the Government’s policy ‘Creating the Conditions for Integration’. Pickles ‘pledged to ‘end the era of multiculturalism’ and ‘that the English language and Christian faith will be restored to the centre of public life’’ (Grayson, 2012 online). These categories mirror changes in the US as alluded to at the start of this paper and also reflect previous research into political and social discourses (as below), although no claim is made to this list being fully constitutive:

- ‘Cultural’ values which are alien to or ‘not quite as good as’ British values. This relates to cultural racism (Modood, 1992, in Poole, 2002) ‘in which religion and culture (rather than colour or origins) constitute the most significant signifiers of racialization’ (Poole, 2002, p. 22).
- Islam as a non-Christian religion of non-Western tradition.

- The speaking and speakers of languages other than English (or, more accurately and more precisely in Britain, other than English, Welsh, Irish, or Scottish Gaelic; although it is recognised that *inside* England, the speaking of Welsh, Irish or Scottish Gaelic is constructed as ‘other’).

a. Britishness as shared cultural values situating Muslims as ‘outsiders within’

Grube (2011, p.630) demonstrates how creation of a values-based notion of ‘Britishness’ in the late Victorian period marked a move away from internal nation divisions (e.g. between the English and Scots) and associated religious affiliations, thereby creating ‘outsiders’ within British society against which all British nationalities could define themselves as morally legitimate.’ We are, by now, entirely familiar with an overt association between Britishness and cultural values discourse resulting in a ‘stratification of citizenship’ into those who really belong, those who have made an effort to belong, and those who don’t belong (Hodkinson, 2020). In the time of the New Labour government (1997 to 2010), in a continuance of Margaret Thatcher’s attack, multiculturalism was viewed as the cause of assumed segregations within a society, identifying a tension between multiculturalism and associated values, and national identity. Post the 9/11 and the London 7/7 terrorist atrocities, some communities were situated as *responsible* for any lack of cohesion (so called ‘self-segregation’) and as a greater threat to national unity:

Public confidence in the welfare state is being undermined by the presence in Britain of immigrants of a different culture. And they have argued that multiculturalism has encouraged Muslims to separate themselves and live by their own values, resulting in extremism and, ultimately, the fostering of a mortal home-grown terrorist threat. (Kundnani, 2007, p.26).

As Poole (2002, p.22) argues in her seminal extensive analysis of the representation of British Muslims in the British press, ‘Muslims have therefore entered the frame as the central racialized Other in Britain’. There are now several subsequent analyses of Muslim media

representation (e.g. Brown, 2006; De Rooij, 2020, Malcolm et al, 2010; Saeed, 2007), and in a meta-analysis of published studies from 2000-2015, investigating the media’s role in constructing the Muslim identity, Ahmed and Matthes (2017, p.235) found a pattern which has emerged globally ‘of linking Muslims and Islam with terrorism, violence, and orthodox ideals, [which] highlights the religion as a threat of a resurgent atavism’. As Poole (2002, p.186) put it, in order to overcome insecurities which have arisen as a result of increased cultural diversity in Britain, media discourse meant to establish a common culture in line with political discourse, effects a perpetuation of ‘the belief that Muslims are wholly different’, ‘have difficulties in adapting to the values of British society’ (Ibid, 67) and are therefore excluded from constructions of Britishness. Phoenix (2019) describes how young British Muslim women growing up in Britain during this period found difficulty in ‘fitting in’ to Britishness. Citing observations by Morey and Yaqin (2011), Allen (2017, p.2) claims Muslims are routinely presented as ‘a very real, ongoing, and at times apocalyptic threat to ‘our’ values, democracies, identities, and way of life’. As Healy (2019) wisely concludes, national values are framed to privilege the value systems of the dominant group (in this case non-Muslims) and in that politicisation, values effectively become the ‘servant of the state’. In terms of racist nativist sentiments (Sanchez, 1997); accusations (Jaret 1999 in Lippard, 2011); and discourses (Pérez Huber, 2011) (see Smith, 2016), the Muslim Other is therefore represented as a danger to national security, a threat to the British way of life and more specifically the values which serve the state’s construction of this way of life, and ultimately therefore a threat to the political order. Muslims are constructed within media and political discourse as the outsider, even the enemy within, in this anti-Muslim racist nativism emerging through cultural values associated with Britishness.

b. Britishness and Languages other than English

Writing about the Canadian context, Ramjattan (2019, p.378, my italics) argues that the maintenance of white supremacy through racist nativism ‘is not only seen in such overt practices as the racial profiling of suspected undocumented immigrants but also *in the*

dominance of English.' Similarly, Shuck (2006, p.259) argues that 'Public discourse surrounding the use of nonstandard varieties of English and non-English languages in the United States is racialized', and that this is underlaid by a language ideology which she refers to as the 'ideology of nativeness'. So, certainly in the North American context the dominance of the English language is viewed through a lens of both nativism and the racialisation of language speakers and languages spoken.

In understanding the racialisation of language speakers and languages within 'ideologies of national identity' (Piller, 2001 in Brookes & Wright, 2020) relating to Britishness, I shall draw heavily on the corpus-assisted investigation of the representation of non-native English speakers living in Britain in the right leaning British press between 2005 and 2017 by Brookes and Wright (2020). Within that time period they note that Gordon Brown's warning in 2007 as Prime Minister, that immigrants *must* learn English to stay in Britain, marked the start of non-native English-speaking migrants learning English as linked to their 'being a part of British society', with this language learning and assimilation framed as being their responsibility (ibid, p.127). They also note the pervasive deficit discourse associated with non-natives through 'collocates such as can't, cannot, unable, and so on, [which] help to foreground migrants' perceived inability to speak English, all the while backgrounding or obscuring details about the languages they do speak.' (ibid, p.120).

Their research reveals particular features of racist nativism (although they do not use this term) within language ideologies associated with Britishness and the espoused value of learning to speak 'fluent' English and of those who make an effort to do so in order to integrate into British Society. Indeed, they note that by 2015, the responsibility of migrants to learn English had shifted from being 'the last line of defence against communities breaking down; [to now holding] the solution to repair already broken communities' (Ibid p.128). Extrapolating from the findings of their study, racist nativist representation of non-native English language speakers (note that multilingual British

citizens are also represented in most of the news articles they consider) are revealed as:

- 1) A drain on resources in terms of financial pressures on the state, poorer working conditions for native English-speaking learners and teachers
- 2) A threat to the British way of life and the very existence of the English language within Britain

The analysis by Brookes and Wright (2020) revealed that throughout the period they investigated, whenever government reports announced statistics relating to the number of pupils with English as an additional language (EAL) in schools in Britain, the press would comment on the associated economic costs for schools and hence also taxpayers. They also note that the relationship between the number of pupils and costs was 'framed in explicitly negative evaluative terms' (Ibid, p.125), thereby causing problems for schools communicated as a burden to schools, teachers and native English-speaking children: schools lacked resources thereby creating a problem for teachers who were struggling to teach said pupils and therefore also for native English-speaking pupils in the same classes. This sentiment is perfectly captured in one press article:

'The immigration explosion is crippling British schools as staff struggle to teach children who cannot speak English. A shocking 30% of *pupils* in Manchester now speak English as a second language, and that figure rises to two in three in some parts of the city. (*Star*, 2010). (Brookes & Wright, 2020, p.130).

Here we can see a conflation of multilingual pupils born in Britain with pupils new to English, both groups captured within the educational term 'pupil with English as an additional language' (EAL). This term, although imperfect (Cunningham, 2017), is a statement about a child's languaging life (or the fact that they live and learn in more than one language) rather than a pejorative term. It is simply therefore not true to say pupils learning English as a second (their term) language cannot speak English.

By 2014, Brookes and Wright (2020, p.125-126) found 'concerns about school funding seem to be replaced by concerns that children with English as a second or additional language are actually 'outperforming' or 'overtaking' children who speak English as their first language.' They notice an associated movement towards pupils with EAL constructed as 'a threat to the native ingroup'. In other words, pupils with EAL once positioned as disadvantaged and requiring extra support, placing a burden on the state, were now situated as overly and unfairly advantaged; a nod towards white victimhood in assertions of political correctness gone mad (Smith, 2016). Brookes and Wright (2020, p.136) suggest their findings may show an emergent trend in public and policy discussions on resource distribution 'on the basis of native language and/or language proficiency, wherein the indigenous British in-group are competing with the migrant out-group', noting that such 'divisive, exclusionary and prejudiced media recommendations would appear unambiguously racist were it not for their being disguised as discourse about language'. They relate this to Skutnabb-Kangas' (1988) original definition of linguicism, or we may call it ethnolinguistic racism (Block, 2018). Relatedly, they also found that translation alongside being cast as a financial burden, was also viewed as an obstacle to integration into British society.

The analysis by Brookes and Wright (2020) provides a glimpse into the ways in which speakers of languages other than English and the speaking of those languages within Britain are simultaneously racialised and viewed as non-British (even when they are British *and* multilingual). Racist nativist discourses situate languages and speakers of languages other than English as a burden and a threat to the nation, in a state which assumes a monolingual language ideology, with English as the native language. A concern with a decline of English in the UK, is perceived as an existential threat to the core of Britishness given that, as Shuck (2006, p.260) argues there is a, 'view of the world's speech communities as naturally monolingual and monocultural, whereby one language is semiotically associated with one nation'. And of course, geo-

politically, the English language is extremely powerful on the global stage.

In accompaniment with these discourses and over the time period of the Brexit referendum, there are also reports of increased xenophobic and racist attacks as a consequence of people speaking languages other than English in England. For example, Rzepnikowska (2019) reports very serious racist attacks on Polish people because of the visibility of their speaking of Polish in public spaces. A post-Brexit report on racist attacks by the Institute of Race Relations found that 'abuse aimed at Eastern/ Western/ Southern Europeans often followed the victim speaking a different language or speaking with an accent' (Komaromi & Singh, 2016).

The next stage is to examine how the racist nativist discourses revealed here in relation to cultural values, Muslims and speakers (and the speaking of) languages other than English in the constant perpetuation of constructions of Britishness by politicians and the media, are reflected in education policy emerging into this context, thereby further stamping an 'authoritative allocation of values' (Ball, 2012, p.3).

4. English Education Policy: Britishness, values and the Muslim 'Other'

Before going further, it is important to clarify that this section focuses on English education policy only, fully cognisant of the critique that 'unlike for the Welsh or Scots, allegiance with England and allegiance with Britain tend to be regarded as one and the same thing' (1997, p.184).

In terms of cultural values, the most important policy shift in England relates to the emergence of Fundamental British Values (hereafter FBV). FBV are defined in education policy as taken directly from the definition of extremism articulated in the revised version of The Prevent Strategy, which was launched in June 2011 as one arm of the government's counter-terrorism policy CONTEST. Within the revised Prevent (2015), extremism is defined as 'vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values'. These values include 'democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs'. This is a shift in policy recognised by Kundnani

and Hayes (2018, p.7) in which from 2005 the analysis of extremism moved from ‘references to formal groups and movements ... towards an emphasis on attitudes, mindsets, and dispositions’. Education policy is now inextricably related to this version of counter terrorism and the prevention of extremism, the underlying cause of which is understood as religious ideology, rather than actual involvement in any extremist group or movement (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). As such, what is required is ‘cultural engineering as a key means of countering the purported spread of extreme ideologies’ (Ibid, 2018, p.8).

Table 1 documents those education policies which refer to FBV, as one mechanism of ‘cultural engineering’. They appear in both statutory and ‘guidance’ documentation and, as the table demonstrates, FBV are widespread, repetitive and deeply ingrained across the education policy landscape, accompanied by legal and regulatory powers.

Table 1.

Year	Policy	Publishing body	Guidance or statutory	Reference to FBV
2011 last updated 2013	Teachers’ standards	DfE	statutory	‘Teachers uphold public trust in the profession and maintain high standards of ethics and behaviour, within and outside school, by: not undermining fundamental British values’ (p.14)
2014	Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools: Departmental advice for maintained schools	DfE	guidance	‘Through ensuring pupils’ SMSC development, schools can also demonstrate they are actively promoting fundamental British values.’ (p.4)
January 2015	Ofsted School Inspection Handbook	Ofsted	Statutory	Schools will be found to be inadequate if: ‘there are serious weaknesses in the overall promotion of pupils’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural development or their physical well-being, so that pupils are intolerant of others and/or reject any of the core values fundamental to life in modern Britain.’ (p.39)
June 2015	The Prevent duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers	DfE	Guidance following the UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Act new 2015 legal duty for teachers and other public-sector	‘to help recipients understand the implications of the Prevent duty. The Prevent duty is the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 on specified authorities, in the exercise of their functions, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.’ (p.3); ‘Schools and childcare providers can also build pupils’.

Table 1 (continued)

			employees to have 'due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism'	resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values' (p.5) Presented as part of safeguarding
From September 2015	Ofsted School Inspection Handbook	Ofsted	Statutory regulation	to be graded as outstanding by Ofsted, schools must demonstrate that 'the promotion of fundamental British values, [is] at the heart of the school's work.' (p.42). (NB this document has been withdrawn by DfE.)
2016	Educational Excellence Everywhere – White paper	DfE	Vision paper	'Ensure a knowledge-based curriculum is complemented by the development of the character traits and fundamental British values that will help children succeed' (p.88).
2018	Ofsted's equality objectives	Ofsted	Report	'In making judgements, inspectors will consider whether those we inspect comply with their relevant duties set out in the Equality Act 2010 and, where applicable, the extent to which they promote British values and promote equality and diversity' (p.2).
2019a	The Education Inspection Framework	Ofsted	statutory	'Inspectors will make a judgement on

Table 1 (continued)

				the personal development of learners by evaluating the extent to which: the provider prepares learners for life in modern Britain by: developing their understanding of fundamental British values' (p.11).
2019	ITT Core Content Framework	DfE	Guidance (but enforced through the ITT inspection framework)	In talking about how the framework sits alongside the Teachers' standards, it makes reference to: 'how Fundamental British Values can be upheld in schools and the importance of showing tolerance and respect for the rights of others' (p.7).
2020	Plan your relationships, sex and health curriculum	DfE	Guidance on the use of external agencies in teaching the new statutory PSHE and RSE curriculum	'Schools should not under any circumstances work with external agencies that take or promote extreme positions' including for example 'promoting divisive or victim narratives that are harmful to British society' and 'a publicly stated desire to abolish or overthrow democracy, capitalism...' (np).

Table 1 (continued)

2020	Headteachers' standards	DfE	Non-statutory (replace the national standards of excellence for headteachers 2015)	Inside and outside of school Headteachers are to 'uphold fundamental British values' 'modelling the behaviour of a good citizen' which is defined in footnote 7 as 'someone who adheres to fundamental British values.' (np).
2020	Initial teacher education (ITE) inspection framework and handbook	Ofsted	Statutory regulation	Providers are rated inadequate if 'Partnership leaders do not ensure that training respects and teaches knowledge and application of fundamental British values and the Equality Act 2010' (p.53). If this is ensured, they are graded good.

To understand further the connection between this radical intrusion of extremism (defined as opposition to FBV) into education within this 'mutually reinforcing policy set', and the racist nativism of the context into which these policies emerged, one must look to evidence their effect, particularly on Muslim pupils. Hard data from the Home Office (2019) shows that:

In the year ending March 2019, there were a total of 5,738 referrals for 5,531 individuals due to concerns that they were vulnerable to being radicalised. The Education sector made the most referrals (33%; 1,887).

Further, 23% (324/1404) of referrals for concerns relating to Islamist radicalisation, were made by the Education sector; the 2nd highest rate. The statistics for 2019 also revealed the number of referrals per region,

revealing that the north east region had the highest proportion of referrals for the Education sector (352 of 1,887; 19%). We are not privy however, as to the nature of those referrals. Although the religion of those referred is not usually captured, the NPCC reported that in 2015 1,394 of people referred were Muslim, compared to 139 Christian (Ratcliffe, 2016, cited in Crawford, 2017).

Before going further, it is important to acknowledge that from the start, until the 2011 revision of Prevent, Muslims had been the sole focus for the funding and operationalisation of the legislation surrounding Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) (see for example, Thomas, 2010); a legacy which appears to spill over into the impact of Prevent today. In their thematic review of empirical studies published between 2015 and 2019

into the impact of Prevent in schools and in ITE, Jerome et al (2019, p.826) found evidence from the studies that despite the fact that the Prevent duty no longer identifies Islam or Muslims as the object of the policy, the duty 'is being interpreted within dominant discourses connecting terrorism, extremism and Islam.' It would appear that Ofsted falls prey to the same perceived connections, perhaps reflecting the ethnic make-up of HMIs according to Ofsted's own figures (5.5% of HMI were BAME in 2017; 5.6% BAME in 2018) (Ofsted, 2019). In 2018, in a speech to a Church of England schools conference, Amanda Spielman, Ofsted's Chief Inspector, publicly backed Head teachers who wanted to ban young Muslim girls from wearing the hijab. Mirroring the discourses identified earlier in this paper, one sentence of her speech seamlessly connected the Muslim faith with the narrowing of young people's horizons, their isolation and segregation, to the indoctrination of extremist ideology. This followed a recommendation by Spielman to Ofsted inspectors the year before to question Muslim primary school girls during inspections if they are wearing a hijab or similar headscarf, which she linked to the sexualisation of young Muslim girls. It is therefore utterly astonishing and ironic how in a more recent speech in December 2020 on the Conservative's new approach to fairness, Liz Truss (in her role as Minister for Women and Equalities) said we should move beyond the fashionable focus on racism and sexism and protected characteristics (as in the equality duty), claiming that 'in Britain you will have the opportunity to succeed at whatever you wish to do professionally... dress however you want to dress' (unless you are a Muslim girl, that is). It is surely unsurprising then that Jerome et al's (2019) review revealed that Muslim pupils feel the impact of the Prevent duty more than other groups, reporting feelings of stigmatisation and of being perceived as a threat or suspect, mirroring the political and media racist nativist discourses identified earlier. The duty of teachers to monitor active opposition to FBV therefore place Muslim students in particular, in a precarious position in involvement in any critical discussions of identity, belonging and beliefs (Crawford, 2017; Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

A further recent and related intervention by Kemi Badenoch, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Minister for Equalities), in a debate in parliament about Black History Month on 20th October 2020, proposed a new values-infused frame for deciding what should and *must not* be taught in schools. It is worth quoting this part of her speech at length:

What we are against is the teaching of contested political ideas as if they are accepted facts. We do not do that with communism, socialism or capitalism.

I want to speak about a dangerous trend in race relations that has come far too close to home in my life, which is the promotion of critical race theory, an ideology that sees my blackness as victimhood and their whiteness as oppression. I want to be absolutely clear that the Government stand unequivocally against critical race theory (Hansard, 2020).

In conflating social theory, which can be tested (and hence scientifically contested), with ideology, which is positioned in her speech against neutrality (as if claimed neutrality itself is not a political stance), the government are able to denounce critical race theory's (and Black Lives Matter) inclusion in school curricula and resources as not adhering to the statutory duty to be 'politically impartial'. As a critical theory, CRT would not contest the need for political impartiality, rather it would raise for scrutiny what is meant by impartiality within a political frame. This announcement in parliament came one month after the DfE's published guidance on teaching the new PSHSE (and RSE) curriculum, in which schools are told categorically not to involve any external agencies construed as extreme, an example of which is defined as 'promoting divisive or victim narratives that are harmful to British society'. In short therefore, any external agency who works to support schools in understanding racism and anti-racism through the lens of CRT are now viewed as extremist and working against FBV. One could therefore view this recent government move as also symptomatic of the 'cultural engineering' to which Kundnani and Hayes (2018) refer as a mechanism of countering extremism in the government's war against particular

ideologies. As a theory and hence an analytic tool which works to identify and describe in order to dismantle racism, interventions such as this by the government (and the anti-woke movement in general (see Doxtador, 2019)) to frame CRT as extremist and illegal, means the dismantling of racist nativism against Muslims, exacerbated by FBV-related policies, appear far less attainable. Indeed, the policy developments in relation to FBV considered here provide an institutional stamp of approval for the assumptions within racist nativist discourses about Muslims, thereby reinforcing assumed white native superiority. As Crawford (2017, p.204) concludes in her examination of FBV in schools, 'The British government's racially biased prescription of 'fundamental British values' to treat the supposed value deficit between the (white British) native over that of the non-native (Muslim other) does little but defend white native superiority and reproduce and reinforce white hegemony.' The attempt to remove CRT as a conceptual tool for anti-racism is also reflective, however, of already existing absences with the above policies.

5. A brief additional note on absences

At this moment in time, we face a global pandemic. A report from Public Health England (2020) revealed an increased risk of death for those from Black, Asian Minority Ethnic communities, concluding in a section entitled, 'Racism, discrimination, stigma, fear and trust', that racism is a factor in the unequal deaths from Covid-19. The Prime Minister Boris Johnson's response to this report and to Black Lives Matter, was to announce the creation of a new 'Race Inequality Commission' with the remit of considering wider inequalities including 'working class white boys in schools'. This commission is to be led by Tony Sewell, who has previously commented that much of the evidence about institutional racism is flimsy and that Black underachievement is due to the low expectations of school leaders who position Black boys as victims (Sewell, 2010). In his letter in December 2020 to the Minister for Equalities, Sewell reported that, 'the evidence is showing that many of the disparities are driven by differences in age, sex, class and geography. As a consequence, the reasons for the disparity may in fact have little to do with racism itself' (Sewell, 2020).

This de-racialisation of education (Barot & Bird, 2001; Gillborn et al, 2016; Troyna & Williams, 1986, Smith, forthcoming) in the removal of a concern about racism is far from politically impartial, but of course, it is more difficult to critique that which is not present, which is precisely why we need CRT. Absences in social policy also betray and authorise symbolic value regarding what is and is not important. The lack of attention to racism in initial teacher education (ITE) policy for example, tells student teachers that understanding racism is not as important as learning about say, behaviour management, even in cases when understanding an individual's behaviour *requires* an understanding of racism in all of its forms. This chosen example from ITE policy is not arbitrary for it reflects the reality of ITE policy at present. The ITE core content framework was published late 2019 as a 'minimum entitlement' for those training to become teachers in England and hence communicates the most essential aspects of this training. A quick search reveals that there is no single reference to race, racism, discrimination, prejudice, or indeed, English as an additional language, bilingual, or multilingual. This lies in stark contrast to the 35 references to behave/behaviour, 25 references to expect/expectation and 22 references to memory. Although this framework is not a statutory curriculum it is effectively enforced given Ofsted's new inspection framework for ITT states under 'risk assessment', that inspectors will: 'check whether the partnership ensures that trainees within a primary or secondary phase receive their minimum entitlement, which is set out in the Department for Education's (DfE) ITT core content framework.'

By communicating that which is construed by Ofsted as the essential minimum entitlement, the absence of reference to racism also suggests it is somehow peripheral or additional to the knowledge required by the profession. As I have argued previously, 'suggestions of curriculum additionality can more easily morph into perceptions of unfair positive/reverse discrimination wherein understandings of advantaging and disadvantaging are reversed' (Smith, 2013, p.439). This is precisely the language used by Liz Truss in the aforementioned speech, when she said of her own

school experience, 'while we were taught about racism and sexism, there was too little time spent making sure everyone could read and write.' One presumes Liz Truss is speaking here about reading and writing in English which takes us neatly into an exploration of the manifestations of Britishness as constructed against multilingualism in education policy. The notion of absences, or at least a greatly reduced emphasis, is also present when considering the education of multilingual pupils in England.

6. English education policy: Britishness and Languages other than English

In terms of policy developments relating to multilingualism and pupils with EAL, Flynn and Curdt-Christiansen (2018) have traced and analysed policies relating to the National Curriculum (NC) and related practice guides pre-2010 (including National Strategies work) and post-2010, to document changes in quantity and discourse. In terms of quantity, they reveal 9 policy and practice documents from 1999 to 2010 and only 3 documents post 2010, hence revealing a huge disparity in 'the amount of text devoted to language policy for EAL pupils and in the explicit guidance for teachers and schools with regard to assessment and curriculum planning' (Ibid, p.410). Leung et al (2021, p.7) too note the lack of a single policy initiative in England to 'introduce a large-scale system-wide formal testing framework for EAL'. In the post-2010 National Curriculum (NC), for example, 8 pages of text focussed on 'how to make their classroom inclusive and specifically EAL-oriented' (Flynn & Curdt-Christiansen 2018, p.418); in comparison there are 2 bullet points consisting of 4 sentences in the 2013 NC, which is still in operation today (with some unrelated adjustments in 2015). However, it is the more fine-grained linguistic analysis which is of particular interest to this paper. Firstly, in the NC documents, they note a shift from discourses of support and acknowledgment of pupils' multilingualism to the use of modal verbs signalling obligation, without practical advice on how to do that which is seen as an obligation. For example, the post-2010 NC in 4.6 reads 'Teachers should plan teaching opportunities to help pupils develop their English and

should aim to provide the support pupils need to take part in all subjects' (DfE, 213). This makes clear the priority is the development of English alone; no mention is made of pupils' other languages or their role in pupils' learning of English and other subject areas, nor of the benefits of multilingualism. This is replicated in the NC documents' use of the term 'language', which post-2010 were all related to 'a monolingual, subject-related context that does not acknowledge a multilingual classroom' (Ibid, p. 419). Of particular importance here, Flynn and Curdt-Christiansen (2018, p.419) reveal a document by DfE published in 2011 which states:

Pupils learning English as an additional language (EAL) share many common characteristics with pupils whose first language is English. However, their learning experience differs because they are learning in and through another language, and because they may come from *cultural backgrounds and communities that have different understandings and expectations of education, language and learning.* (DfE, 2011, my italics)

Although Flynn and Curdt-Christiansen do not draw on the concept of racist nativism, this one statement (which is part of only 4 pages, in comparison to around 50 pages pre-2010 on how to plan for pupils with EAL), reveals reflections, if not manifestations, of the racist nativism identified earlier for the speaking of and the speakers of languages other than English in England. Here, pupils with EAL are cast in deficit terms as emanating from cultural backgrounds/communities with different expectations. Different to what or whom, one might reasonably ask. The context of the sentences of course, leads one to assume the contrast is with monolingual British pupils. Use of the term 'expectations' implies a variance in values between those pupils from some cultural backgrounds who are multilingual, and pupils who are British monolingual native English speakers. This picture is further complicated when one considers that all languages lie within a hierarchy which emerges locally according to the history of migration and the economic context, and which is set within the global geopolitical landscape. Consequently, the 'home' languages of pupils with EAL are not equally valued and this too intersects with the

racialisation of language speakers, meaning that some bilingualisms are more highly prized than others and are therefore, alongside non-white multilingual speakers, more likely to be framed as in greater alignment with values in constructions of Britishness. Take, for example, three pupils with EAL all of whom have a European 'home' language; in light of the above DfE document, a white French-speaking pupil is more likely to be constructed as having a 'cultural background' less at variance with Britishness, than, for example, a Romanian speaking Roma pupil, or a Portuguese speaking pupil from Angola.

Returning to Table 1, policies of relevance beyond documents analysed by Flynn and Curdt-Christiansen (2018) include:

- The ITT Core Content Framework, which, as in the previous analysis contains no reference at all to EAL, bi/multilingual(ism), thereby marking this as less significant to practice despite the fact that DfE figures show that 21.3% of Primary age pupils and 17.1% of Secondary age pupils have, according to school census data, EAL.
- The Teachers' Standards, with one reference to EAL in a list which includes pupils with special educational needs, those of high ability and those with disabilities.
- The inspection frameworks.
- The newly implemented Phonics Screening Check (the only policy not included in Table 1).

Remarkably, there is no reference to pupils with EAL in the schools' inspection framework and only minimal reference in the current ITT inspection framework, wherein all 4 references to pupils with EAL appear in a list alongside 'pupils who have SEND', mirroring the Teachers' Standards. The phonics screening check (PSC) was implemented in 2012 for all pupils in year 1 of Primary school. Children are asked to decode a list of 40 words, 20 of which are pseudo words. As Carter (2020, p.605) reports, teachers described 'the difficulty of explaining to the child with EAL that some words they were being asked to read did not have a meaning while,

at the same time, encouraging the child to ask about meaning and extend their English vocabulary'. As Pierlejewski (2020, p.263) argues, 'EAL children are particularly disadvantaged by the current system. Their communication is not measured and therefore has no value, as only communication in English counts.' In other words, for pupils with EAL, absences are not only present in policy development, but also in enforced and regulated practices such as the PSC.

In summary, the policies reveal an overwhelming focus on the learning of English with the only acknowledgement of pupils' multilingualism phrased as a deficit (alongside other groups of pupils such as those with SEND), as something to recover from (Cunningham, 2017) and as something at variance with the values associated with monolingual native English speaking. The celebration of multilingualism as an individual or community asset, or an understanding of the role of pupils' home languages in their learning of subjects in school, including English, is entirely absent in current policy. The cumulative tone of this policy development, together with the removal of an interest in multilingualism signals an assimilationist agenda reflective of the racist nativist discourses which position the speaking and speakers of languages other than English as an existential threat to the British way of life.

7. Final Thoughts

Education policy is revealed here as reflecting the racist nativism argued to be prevalent in political and media discourse, thereby ascribing authoritative symbolic value to selected elements of culture favoured in notions of Britishness. Cultural values perceived as incompatible with these favoured, reiterated and, through policy, reinforced elements of British values are constructed as exclusive of or in opposition to Britishness: the values associated with being a Muslim in opposition to British non-Muslims; and the values of being multilingual in opposition to a monolingual native English speaker, or, as a minimum, a fluent native-like English speaker. These supposed oppositional values are of course not overtly named in any education policy document; although recent government moves to name CRT and BLM comes startlingly close. But

nonetheless, their perceived oppositional nature is reinforced by the sheer weight of policies relating to FBV, their impact on Muslim pupils, and the overwhelming incursion of a securitisation agenda in education policy, supported by England's powerful regulatory body, Ofsted. We can see this reinforcement too in government moves to withdraw educational theory as an emancipatory tool to dismantle the racist practices exacerbated by FBV. We can see reflections, or at least ghostly apparitions of these 'oppositional' values in the reduced attention to multilingualism and the denial of opportunities for multilingual learning and assessment which benefits all pupils, but particularly those with EAL. We see them, therefore, in the assimilationist tendencies of a monolingual language ideology. Crucially, however, we also see them in particular absences in the general trend towards a deracialisation of education, thereby attributing symbolic value to both that which is present and to the absence of that which is absent; a sort of state-mandated epistemology of ignorance (Mills, 1997). As Mills (2007, p. 18) explains, 'What people of color quickly come to see—in a sense, the primary epistemic principle of the racialized social epistemology of which they are the object—is that they are not seen at all' (Mills, 2007, p.18), thereby self-insulating the 'white delusion of racial [and native] superiority ... against refutation' (Ibid, p.19). Perhaps then, our future focus should be on examining what is communicated to teachers in policy absences and how such absences impact on racist nativist epistemologies of ignorance in constructions of Britishness.

8. Disclosure statement

The author(s) declare no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

9. Open Access Policy

This journal provides immediate open access to its content with no submission or publications fees. This journal article is published under the following Creative Commons Licence:



This licence allows others to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to this article (and other works in this journal), and/or to use them for any other lawful purpose in accordance with the licence.

PRISM is also indexed in the world largest open-access database: DOAJ (the [Directory of Open Access Journals](#)). DOAJ is a community-curated online directory that indexes and provides access to high quality, open access, peer-reviewed journals.



10. References

- Ahmed, S. & Matthes, J. (2017). Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis. *the International Communication Gazette* 79(3), 219-244.
- Allen, C. (2017). Political Approaches to Tackling Islamophobia: An 'Insider/Outsider' Analysis of the British Coalition Government's Approach between 2010–15. *Soc. Sci.* 6(3), 1-19.
- Apple, M.W. (2006). Rhetoric and reality in critical educational studies in the United States. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 27(5), 679-687. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01425690600958923>
- Apple, M.J. (2019). On Doing Critical Policy Analysis. *Educational Policy* 33(1), 276–287.
- Ball, S.J. (2012) *Politics and Policy Making in Education: Explorations in policy sociology*. London: Routledge
- Ball, S.J., Maguire, M. & Braun, A. (2012). *How Schools do Policy*. London: Routledge
- Barot, R., & Bird, J. (2001). Racialization: the genealogy and critique of a concept. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24(4), 601-618.
- Betz, H. (2019). Facets of nativism: a heuristic exploration *Patterns of Prejudice*, 53:2, 111-135. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1572276>
- Block, D. (2018). The political economy of language education research (or the lack thereof): Nancy Fraser and the case of translanguaging. *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies*, 15(4), 237-257.
- Brookes, G & Wright, D. (2020). From burden to threat: A diachronic study of language ideology and migrant

- representation in the British press. In P. Rautionaho, A. Nurmi and K. Klemola (Eds.) *Corpora and the Changing Society: Studies in the Evolution of English* (pp.113-140). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company
- Brown, M.D. (2006). Comparative Analysis of Mainstream Discourses, Media Narratives and Representations of Islam in Britain and France Prior to 9/11. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 26(3), 297-312.
- Carter, J. (2020). The assessment has become the curriculum: Teachers' views on the Phonics Screening Check in England. *British Educational Research journal* 46(3), 593-609.
- Christian, M. (2019). A Global Critical Race and Racism Framework: Racial Entanglements and Deep and Malleable Whiteness. *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity*, 5(2), 169– 185.
- Cunningham, C.M. (2017) *Saying more than you realise about 'EAL': discourses of educators about children who speak languages beyond English*. [Unpublished Doctoral Thesis]. University of York.
- Crawford, C.E. (2017) Promoting 'fundamental British values' in schools: a critical race perspective. *Curriculum Perspectives* 37, 197–204.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s41297-017-0029-3>
- De Rooj, L. (2020) *Islam in British Media Discourses: Understanding Perceptions of Muslims in the News*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- DfE (2011). *Developing Quality Tuition: Effective practice in schools, English as an Additional Language*. London: DfE.
- Doxtdator, B. (2019). *Putting Research Ed's Equity Backlash Under the Microscope*. Long View on Education. [Putting ResearchEd's Equity Backlash Under the Microscope - Long View on Education](https://www.longviewoneducation.com/putting-research-ed-s-equity-backlash-under-the-microscope/)
- Flynn, N. & Curdt-Christiansen. X.L. (2018). Intentions versus enactment: making sense of policy and practice for teaching English as an additional language, *Language and Education* 32(5), 410-427.
- Grayson, J. (2012, March). *The strange xenophobic world of coalition integration policy*. Institute of Race Relations. <http://www.irr.org.uk/news/the-strange-xenophobic-world-of-coalition-integration-policy/>
- Home Office (2019, December) *Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, England and Wales, April 2018 to March 2019*. [Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2018 to March 2019 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/821837/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-2018-2019.pdf)
- Gillborn, D., Rollock, N., Warmington, P., & Demack, S. (2016). *Race, Racism and Education: inequality, resilience and reform in policy & practice. A Two-Year Research Project Funded by the Society for Educational Studies (SES) National Award 2013*. Final Report to Funders.
- Grosvenor, I. (2018). 'What do they know of England who only England know': a case for an alternative narrative of the ordinary in twenty-first-century Britain. *History of Education* 47(2), 148-168.
- Grube, D. (2011). How can 'Britishness' be Re-made? *The Political Quarterly* 82 (4), 628-635.
- Hansard (2020, October) *Black History Month* Hansard Volume 682. [Black History Month - Tuesday 20 October 2020 - Hansard - UK Parliament](https://www.parliament.uk/hansard/commons/2020/october/2020-10-20/black-history-month)
- Healy, M. (2019). Belonging, Social Cohesion and Fundamental British Values. *British Journal of Educational Studies* 67(4),423-438.
- Hervik, P. (2015). Xenophobia and Nativism. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Vol. 25, 2nd ed., pp. 796–801). Oxford: Elsevier
- Higham, J. 1955. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press
- Hodkinson, A. (2020). Fundamental British Values: Radicalising British Children into a Manufactured Them and Us Narrative Concept of Britishness? *International Review of Qualitative Research* 13(1), 23–40
- HMG (2011) *The Prevent strategy*. London, The Stationery Office.
- Jacobson, J. (1997). Perceptions of Britishness. *Nations and Nationalism* 3(2), 181-199.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-5078.1997.00181.x>
- Jerome, L., Elwick, A. & Kazim, R. (2019). The impact of the Prevent duty on schools: A review of the evidence. *British Educational Research Journal* 45(4), 821-837.
- Kendi, I.X. (2019). *How to be an Antiracist*. New York: One World.

- Komaromi, P., & K. Singh. 2016. *Post-Referendum Racism and Xenophobia: The Role of Social Media Activism in Challenging the Normalisation of Xeno-Racist Narratives*. <http://www.irr.org.uk/app/uploads/2016/07/PRRX-Report-Final.pdf>.
- Kundnani, A. (2007). Integrationism: The Politics of Anti-Muslim Racism. *Race and Class* 48 (4), 24–44. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306396807077069>
- Kundnani, A. & Hayes, B. (2018). *The globalisation of Countering Violent Extremist policies: Undermining human rights*. Transnational Institute.
- Leonardo, Z. & Grubb, W.N. (2014) *Education and Racism: A Primer on Issues and Dilemmas*. New York: Routledge.
- Leung, C., Evans, M. & Liu, Y. (2021) English as an Additional Language Assessment Framework: Filling a Void in Policy and Provision in School Education in England. *Language Assessment Quarterly [advance online publication]*, 1-20.
- Linton, R. & Irving Hallowell, A. (1943). Nativistic Movements. *American Anthropologist* 45 (2), 230–240. <https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1943.45.2.02a00070>
- Lippard, C. D. (2011). Racist Nativism in the 21st Century. *Sociology Compass* 5(7), 591–606. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00387.x>.
- Malcolm D, Bairner A. & Curry G (2010) Woolmergate: Cricket and the representation of Islam and Muslims in the British press. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 34(2), 215–235.
- Mills, C.S. (1997). *The racial contract*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Mills, C.S. (2007). White Ignorance. In S. Sullivan & N. Tuana (Eds.) *Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance*. (pp.11-38). New York: State University of New York.
- Ofsted (2019) Equality objectives progress review 2017–18 [Ofsted: Equality objectives progress review 2017 to 2018 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/814118/Ofsted-Equality-objectives-progress-review-2017-to-2018-publishing-service.gov.uk)
- Pérez Huber, L. P., Lopez, C.B., Malagon, M.C, Velez, V., and Solorzano D.G. (2008). Getting beyond the ‘Symptom’, Acknowledging the ‘Disease’: Theorizing Racist Nativism. *Contemporary Justice Review* 11 (1), 39–51. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10282580701850397>.
- Pérez Huber, L. P. (2011). Discourses of Racist Nativism in California Public Education: English Dominance as Racist Nativist Microaggressions. *Educational Studies*. 47, 379–401. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131946.2011.589301>
- Phoenix, A. (2019). Negotiating British Muslim belonging: a qualitative longitudinal study. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42(10), 1632-1650.
- Pierlejewski, M. (2020) Constructing deficit data doppelgängers: The impact of datafication on children with English as an additional language. *Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood* 21(3), 253-265.
- Poole, E. (2002). *Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Ramjattan, V.A. (2019) Racist nativist microaggressions and the professional resistance of racialized English language teachers in Toronto. *Race, Ethnicity and Education* 22(3), 374-390. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2017.1377171>
- Rizvi, F. (2005). Representations of Islam and Education for Justice. In C. McCarthy, W. Crichlow, G. Dimitriadis and N. Dolby (Eds.), *Race, Identity, and Representation in Education*. (2nd ed., pp. 167-178). New York: Routledge.
- Rzepnikowska, A. (2019) Racism and xenophobia experienced by Polish migrants in the UK before and after Brexit vote. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 45(1), 61-77.
- Saeed, A. (2007) Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media. *Sociology Compass* 1(2), 443–462.
- Sanchez, G. T. (1997). Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in Late Twentieth Century America. *International Migration Review* 31 (4), 1009–1030. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2547422>
- Sewell, T. (2010, September) *Master class in victimhood*. Prospect. [Master class in victimhood - Prospect Magazine](https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/master-class-in-victimhood)
- Shuck, G. (2006). Racializing the Nonnative English Speaker. *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education* 5(4), 259–276. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327701jlie0504_1
- Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1988). Multilingualism and the education of minority children. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, T & J. Cummins (Eds.) *Minority education: from shame to struggle* (pp.9-44). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Smith, H.J. (2013) A critique of the teaching standards in England (1984–2012): discourses of equality and

maintaining the status quo. *Journal of Education Policy*, 28(4), 427-448.

Smith, H.J. (2016) Britishness as racist nativism: a case of the unnamed 'other', *Journal of Education for Teaching*, 42(3), 298-313.

Taylor, E. (2009). The Foundations of Critical Race theory in Education: An Introduction. In E. Taylor, D. Gillborn, & G. Ladson-Billings (Eds.), *Foundations of Critical Race Theory in Education* (pp. 1-13). New York: Routledge.

Thomas, P. (2010) Failed and Friendless: The UK's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Programme. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12, 442-458.

Troyna, B., & Williams, J. (1986). *Racism, Education and the State*. London: Routledge.